"modules" through which law can organize the complex relationships into "lumpy packages" of legal relations (Smith 2012) .
The second part of the in rem theory of property is the emphasis on the right to exclude; that is, the right to exclude others from some definite thing is central to what the owner owns (Merrill and Smith 2001) . To describe someone as an owner of some thing is to say that someone has the right to exclude others' use of that thing. Merrill (1998) holds that the right to exclude is more than just one stick in the bundle of property rights: "Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource . . . and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property." However, Smith (2014) recently argued that "the right to exclude . . . is not quite a sine qua non" of property." In the same essay, he addresses other property rights, such as the right to transfer and the right to use. Even more recently, Chang (2015) claimed that "ownership" is just one type of property right, labeling the right to transfer and the right to use, among others, as "subsidiary rights." Despite these recent elaborations, however, the in rem concept retains its long-time emphasis on the right to exclude as the natural consequence of defining property rights as a law of things. Under this view, then, the first question to ask remains who owns the thing, which generally means who is the gatekeeper who has exclusive control over it. Merrill and Smith (2001) argue that legal realists and legal economists have successfully replaced the traditional in rem concept of property rights with the bundle of rights picture. In their view, someone who believes that property constitutes a right to a thing might be mocked for being lack of sophistication. Nonetheless, the Blackstonian concept of absolute dominion still dominates our imagination of property rights. The standard trilogy of private, communal, and state property rights presumes the in rem concept of property rights and is evidence of the Blackstonian concept. "Theorists push reforms towards one type or the other, but none" has substantially challenged the trilogy itself (Heller 2001) .
Private property, despite the inherent ambiguity of its boundaries, is the benchmark and starting point of this trilogy. Blackstone's sole and despotic dominion over the external things of the world is an in rem portrayal of property rights. Further, as Dagan and Heller (2001) argue, "comm[unal] property designates resources that are owned or controlled by a finite number of people who manage the resource together and exclude outsiders." Essentially, it is "a regime that holds some resources as a commons among a group of 'insiders,' but as an exclusive right against 'outsiders'" (Rose 1998) . It is "commons on the inside, [private] property on the outside" (Rose 1998 ). State property, or centralized property, refers to property over which the state holds all rights of exclusion and is the sole locus of decision-making regarding the use of resources (Heller 2001) . Like the definition of private property, the definitions of both communal and state property present a relationship between a thing and an owner, in which exclusion is the core. 6 The third component of the in rem view is the numerous clausus principle. Merrill and Smith (2000) develop the optimal standardization thesis and further discuss the numerus clausus principle based on the in rem concept of property rights, which, on the whole, overemphasizes the role of law and downplays the role of social norms in the evolution of property rights. In the world of numerus clausus, law is the main source of property rights. Merrill and Smith (2001) argue that the government, particularly the legislature, should play a role in standardizing rights, an argument that is closely aligned with Bentham's (1975) supposition that without law there would be no rights. Smith's (2003) well-known analogy between language and property is apt here. He pointed out that the grammar of a language is standardized spontaneously, whereas the source of the standardization of property rights is different.
In rem property rights theory also dominates the evolution of property rights literature, the majority of which, following the path-breaking work of Harold Demsetz, focuses on the paradigmatic situation in which the evolutionary process begins with open-access or communal property and ends with private individualized property. Demsetz (1967) centers his discussion on the emergence of private property among Indians of the Labrador Peninsula. Robert Ellickson (1993) explores the switch from group ownership to individual ownership over time using various empirical materials.
Finally, Michael Heller (1998) investigates the post-communist transitions of property regimes in Russia, whose aim was a shift from government ownership to private ownership.
In summary, the Blackstonian idea of property rights defined as the exclusive relationship between a thing and its owner might be more powerful and persistent in legal 7 research than scholars thought (Merill and Smith 2001a) . Its prevalence is likely owing to its clear-cut, intuitive nature (Ackerman 1978) , which reduces information costs (Merill and Smith 2000) . The the real world is more complicated (Qiao 2016) , however. Hence, I
examine the competing concepts of property rights in Chinese land reform in the two following sections.
The Fable of Chinese Property Law
At first glance, both Chinese property law and the public discourse on Chinese land reform adopt the in rem view outlined above and follow the numerus clausus principle closely. The 2004 Constitutional Amendment stipulates that "citizens' legal property shall not be violated," which was widely cheered by commentators both inside and outside China as a landmark success in China's long march toward a market economy and constitutionalism based on private property (e.g., Buckley 2004) . Article 5 of the 2007 PRC Property Law states that "the varieties and contents of real rights shall be stipulated by law," which is essentially the Chinese version of numerus clausus (wuquan fading).
3 The legislative interpretation is that the establishment of new kinds of property rights and the content of those rights can be stipulated only by law, i.e., cannot be left to agreement between parties. The underlying rationale, according to this legislative interpretation, is that property rights differ from contract rights in the sense that there are thousands of obligators, as a result of which the former cannot be decided by the parties concerned, only by law (Standing Committee of NPC 2007) . This is a perfect match with Merrill and Smith's (2000) information cost theory. The legislators also considered that new property rights might emerge, and thus that property law should allow room for their development. However, again consistent with Merrill and Smith (2000) , the Chinese legislators concerned concluded that new property rights can be sanctioned only by law (Standing Committee of NPC 2007).
The in rem picture of property rights in China is vividly exemplified in the mass media by the phenomenon of the nailhouse (dingzihu). A Chinese neologism that first appeared in the media in 2007, the term "nailhouse," refers to a hold-out house standing in the way of urban redevelopment like a stubborn nail. (Xu 2007) . On March 21, Yang Wu, the husband concerned, climbed onto the roof of his house, hoisted the national flag, and unfurled a banner reading "citizens' legal right to private property cannot be violated" (Xu 2007 ). Wu Ping, his wife, stood in front of their home with a copy of the Chinese Constitution in her hands, Article 13 of which stipulates the exact words written on the banner. Within 24 hours, this poignant scene had attracted national and even international attention. On March 22, reporters from around the world rushed to Chongqing to see "the coolest nail household in history." 4 The case was settled by offering more compensation to the owners, the amount of which remains a secret. This case was widely applauded as a great success in protecting private property against public power. In the words of the New York Times, "a simple homeowner stared down the forces of large-scale redevelopment that are sweeping this country, blocking the preparation of a gigantic construction site by an act of sheer will" (French 2007 ).
Mainstream opinion attributed the couple's success to the power of law (Hong 2007) , with many believing that the new Chinese Property Law and 2004 Amendment to the Chinese Constitution had enabled an ordinary couple to resist and prevent an abuse of public power "by an act of sheer will" (French 2007 ).
The public discourse on rural land reform also presents an in rem picture,
focusing on whether rural land should be privatized, re-collectivized or even nationalized (Qin 2008) . The privatization proposal emphasizes individual autonomy, liberty, and the necessity of securing private property for long-term economic development (Chen 2014) , whereas the re-collectivization proposal considers the decline of the irrigation system in the rural area and the overall insufficient supply of public goods to be the failure of the country's Household Responsibility System (HRS), and claims that re-collectivized rural land would also have an advantage in terms of economies of scale (Bai 2015) . The nationalization proposal is more complicated: some proponents propose state land ownership for the purpose of preventing village collectives from violating individual households' land rights (Chen 2014 ) whereas others propose it as a strategy to modernize the agricultural sector through the creation of large-scale farm operations (Chen 2014 In reality, the separation of LURs from land ownership is a central feature of the evolution of the Chinese land regime. This separation has resulted in the emergence of urban LURs ("ULURs") and the rural LMCRs ("RLCMRs"). In the 1980s, the Chinese government, which had set development as its supreme goal, consciously and pragmatically gave up the unitary conception of public land ownership and focused on restructuring the complex social and legal relationships surrounding property. Both
ULURs and RLCMRs emerged, and were gradually adopted into law as sticks detachable from the bundle of sticks of state-owned land and collective-owned land, respectively.
This process has involved the gradual adjustment of the rights and obligations between land owners (the state and collectives) and land users. Although the rights of both are According to Merrill and Smith (2000) , inventing new modes of real property rights such as the covenants in Keppell and allowing them to be established as property rights would create unacceptable information costs to third parties. In the case of ULURs, the entire ULURs assignment contract "runs with the land," i.e., runs automatically with the land even when it passes into remote hands (Chang and Smith 2012:35) : the transfer of ULURs means the transfer not only of the rights and obligations specified in the registration documents, but also of those specified in the assignment contract. 6 A standard
ULURs assignment contract allows specially-tailored terms on the use of the land, which can be as specific as "commercial office (value-added telecommunication business) use" 7 and "the nature of the main constructions, the nature of affiliated buildings, floor area gone, which is consistent with the resilience theory of ownership in civil law (Chen 2004 ).
RLCMRs
It was Chinese farmers, not the government, that created RLCMRs, the first key institutional innovation in China's market transition. The Chinese government did the right thing by tolerating the emergence and development of such an institution, and has been cautiously building legal institutions to secure people's expectations, to reduce the risk, and also to resolve disputes. It is a long and yet-to-be-done process. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that RLCMRs were not created by law, and its contents are still evolving beyond the strict boundaries of law.
The Creation of RLCMRs
The underlying system of RLCMRs is the HRS, the essence of which is to liberate Chinese farmers so that they can produce for themselves on individually allocated plots of land. Finally, RLCMRs are created at the moment the corresponding contract is signed (Article 22 of the RLCL). Although this is, of course, not decisive evidence of the contractual nature of RLCMRs, registration is viewed as more of an in rem effect (Smith 2015) .
RLCMRs were initially treated as contract rights, but have gradually been sanctioned as property rights in the past three decades together with extending their terms and imposing restrictions on interference by village collectives (Chen 1996) .
In In the wake of rapid urbanization and the flow of millions of farmers into cities, the need for agricultural land transfers has intensified in recent years. Since 2008, a number of central government documents have reiterated the goal of establishing "a market for RLMCRs." Nevertheless, substantial progress has yet to be made. The most recent reform plan delineated three redlines for any reform: land ownership must remain public, the amount of arable land should remain above the minimum necessary for national food self-sufficiency, and farmers' interests should be protected (Hong 2014 ).
The ambivalence is understandable. Collective land ownership is ideologically central to a nation that still calls itself communist. Public ownership, furthermore, needs not hinder gradual reform, as we have seen from the rise of the HRS, the development of an urban land market, and the reform of state-owned enterprises. The other two conditions are of more pragmatic importance. The protection of arable land is based on a strategic concern for food self-sufficiency that may not only be unattainable but, paradoxically, may even lead to gross inefficiencies. Self-sufficiency may also be contrary to the third condition. It is conventional wisdom that landless farmers in Chinese cities pose a serious threat to social order in times of economic downturn. Therefore, the retention of small household plots, no matter how inefficient in terms of economies of scale, is seen as serving as an essential social safety net for migrant workers, at least until the government builds a social welfare system in the countryside. First, "public interest" was designed to restrain the government's expropriation power but, in China, expropriation is the only way to convert rural land to urban landonly the latter can be sold and put to various uses. Article 43 of the LAL requires that "any unit or individual that needs to use land for construction must apply for the use of state-owned land in accordance with the law," which means that city and county governments must expropriate rural land to satisfy the land needs of rapid industrialization and urbanization process. It is thus no wonder that "public interest" has been extremely widely interpreted. Therefore, defining "public interest" more strictly without changing the current land structure is a non-starter. If urban users cannot buy land from farmers for non-agricultural use, there is no other way for them to buy land but to buy it from the government that they can receive land, and government land is simply rural land that has been expropriated. Rural land reform is challenging, and the final institutions will be built on an evaluation of different experimental plans. As happened with the HRS, the property laws that will confirm the completion of such evaluation will come once effective practices have been recognized. *** In summary, RLMCRs are subject to and subsidiary to both collective land ownership and the state's police power (i.e., a "state act," as stated in the legislative interpretation) in land conversion and expropriation. RLMCRs are still not strong in rem rights per se. Rather, as one stick in the bundle of collective property rights, they are entangled in the relationship among rights holders, collective land owners, and the state.
Conclusion
Understanding property as a bundle of sticks provides a logical basis for separating ULURs and RLCMRs from public land ownership, and also for rearranging the sticks to adapt to social and economic developments, which are often well ahead of the legislature. Despite the enthusiasm for private land ownership among scholars and the mass media alike, Chinese policy makers have taken the more pragmatic approach of adjusting the bundle of property rights cautiously and carefully while keeping land ownership public. This is not to say that they understand or even know about such scholarly jargon, but rather that when they try to accommodate new changes in reality in their daily work through gradual policy and legal reforms, they do not take property as an undivided concept but adjust the rights and obligations of the related parties with great care. This is now the bundle of rights idea has become rooted in the evolution of Chinese land laws. A recent policy development serves as another example of the stick-by-stick approach to land reform in China. To resolve the conundrum between protecting farmers' property rights and promoting farmland transactions, the current government proposed the separation of three rights: land ownership rights, land contract rights, and land management rights (Zhang 2014 ). The idea is that rural households will keep their land contract rights, which cannot currently be freely transferred, but will be able to transfer land management rights to agricultural companies, banks, and other entities outside village collectives to realize the market value of the land (Wu 2015) . The proposal's details are still to be figured out, and the consequence of separating land management rights from land contract rights fully examined (Liu 2015) . The stick-by-stick approach has its own problems, including the costs and uncertainty incurred by fragmented and unstandardized property rights (Ellickson 2012) , the political maneuvering in the reform process (Qiao 2016) , and the weakness of individual rights. Nevertheless, we can expect it to continue to dominate China's land reform, driven by pragmatism and incrementalism, for the foreseeable future.
